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Abstract:  The Irish social partnership is comparatively unusual in the way that corporatist
bargaining also accommodates community and voluntary sector organisations. This paper
examines the origins and significance of the Community/Voluntary Pillar (CVP) in relation to a
fiscal and social crisis and a crisis of legitimacy for the political elite. It identifies some key driving
forces in the pillar and explores the case of one in particular – the Irish National Organisation of
the Unemployed (INOU). While sceptical of accounts that are dismissive of the Pillar, the paper




he Irish model of social partnership is comparatively unusual in the way
that it accommodates the involvement of farmer associations and
community and voluntary sector organisations. Like other countries, Ireland
has had some previous experience with tripartite governance (during the
1970s) although, since 1987 when this type of arrangement re-commenced, a
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strategic consensus and drew in a wider spectrum of interests (O’Donnell,
1998; O’Donnell and Thomas, 1998). This paper explores the entry, context
and significance of one of these new actors, the community voluntary pillar
(CVP), whose inclusion in social partnership might, from certain perspectives,
seem anomalous. For the organisations involved, this was a landmark in a
process of evolving participation taking several years. A number of
organisations active in the fields of anti-unemployment work, social welfare
campaigning and community development had emerged during the 1980s
against a background of economic and political malaise. Not aligned to
political parties they became quite politicised in their understanding of their
role and potential. From the late 1980s, they began a process that changed
their status from external critics to critical participants in what was
increasingly dubbed social partnership. This eventually culminated in the
“Community Pillar” in October 1996, when the Taoiseach (Prime Minister)
John Bruton invited a number of organisations to form a group for the
purposes of joining in formal talks on a new Social Partnership Programme
(Partnership 2000) that winter.
Against a background of debate on the significance of social partnership
more broadly, which tends to make few references to the CVP at the national
level, and explorations focused solely on local, area based  and development
partnership initiatives, this paper takes a national level focus. It is suggested
that the national origins of the CVP and its entry to social partnership lie in
a fiscal and economic crisis and in turn a crisis of legitimacy and governance.
Moreover, this crisis was not capable of being resolved through social
partnership based on “conventional” social partners alone and the initial
model had its own legitimation deficits in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Ultimately, that crisis passed and the subsequent role and significance of the
CVP was altered, and in some respects diminished. 
The paper addresses these themes in the following sequence. First, it sets
out the economic and political context for the social partnership process that
began in 1987. Second, it identifies the circumstances leading to the
innovation of the community and voluntary pillar and the processes of its
creation. Finally, it looks at the case of the Irish National Organisation for the
Unemployed (INOU), one of the initial driving forces within the CVP and its
pathway into Social Partnership. The focus is mainly on the earlier period to
the late 1990s. Conclusions on the case of the INOU in this phase cannot
necessarily be applied to other components of the Community Pillar or to the
more recent phase. 
The paper is sceptical about grand-theoretical portrayals of social
partnership (or the CVP within it) and its influence on the economic wonder of
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social partnership for democracy generally. However, it does point to the need
to address such questions in concrete rather than speculative ways. The paper
may be relevant to wider issues, such as ways in which “third sector”
organisations become involved in policy processes at national level and what
outcomes we can expect from such involvement. In contrast to other countries
where the “third sector” is either independent (USA) or given a defined role in
delivery (Germany), or largely peripheral (UK), the case of Irish social
partnership has revealed another possibility. The paper tries to avoid the kind
of generalisations of a negative and positive kind that characterise discussions
of the pillar’s role in social partnership. The process is viewed neither as
regime transformation “by” civil society nor Thatcherism in corporatist drag.
The content and conclusions flow from research that attempts to explore the
CVP’s role empirically, combining documentary and interview material. A
series of face to face taped interviews with some 25 leading figures from the
Community Pillar and numbers of others outside the Pillar inform the paper.
However, only a subset of these interviews, particularly with past and present
leading INOU figures are drawn on here and, even then, only in an illustrative
way. 
II WHY EXAMINE THE COMMUNITY PILLAR?
The significance of the community pillar is a relatively minor theme in
discussions of social partnership at the national level in Ireland. At one level,
discussions of social partnership tend to revolve around corporatist paradigms
in which the comparative focus is on union-employer-state relationships
(Hardiman, 2000, 1998, 1988; Rhodes, 2001; Baccaro and Simoni, 2004). A
theme in this debate is where to place Ireland in terms of industrial relations
models ranging from corporatism to liberal pluralism. The term competitive
corporatism (Rhodes, 2001) has gained currency in distinguishing between
neo-liberal or social corporatist characterisations in the Irish case. In this
comparative industrial relations context, the “local” dimension refers to
industrial bargaining/partnership at the level of workplace, firm, industry or
sector and is very important in comparative discussion of corporatism. The
extent and significance of local partnership in this context is the focus of some
critical debate in relation to the Irish case (McCartney and Teague, 1997;
Roche, 1998; Roche and Geary, 1998). 
But in the Irish context, when “local partnership” is discussed, it usually
has nothing to do with industrial relations but refers to local community
development and programmes operating under EU or government auspices
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community development groups. Local partnership in the latter context has
been an intensive area of activity in Ireland over the past 15 years whose
comparative context is very distinct from that of corporatism and industrial
relations. While industrial relations has diverged from the UK standard since
the 1980s, there is much in Ireland to compare – in relation to local or
community development partnership models – with the UK and other EU
states (Chanan et al, 2000). The difficulty is that the CVP is usually discussed
in relation to the latter alone and discussion tends to become dominated by
local issues (Rush, 1999; Powell and Geoghegan, 2004). Conversely, when
considered in the corporatist context, the CVP is possibly viewed as anomalous
in that community and voluntary organisations deal almost exclusively with
government. In that sense they are not strictly “social partners” participating
in a bargaining process that the government facilitates as with employers and
unions (Hardiman, 2000, pp. 301-4). 
There is some justification for exploring the industrial relations and local
development agendas separately. However, the national level significance of
the CVP can be missed unless the account is situated in a wider perspective of
state-civil society relations and a historical perspective. This article takes the
view that the origins of the CVP and its inclusion in the process of national
level social partnership can be fruitfully explored in the context of a crisis for
the political elite and for liberal representative politics in the face of deepening
social malaise. The instigation of social partnership not only served to address
the underlying economic and social problems which the political elite had
failed to resolve, but also provided an institutional mechanism to alleviate a
political crisis of legitimacy. The origins and influence of the CVP are tied up
with attempts to address the underlying social and legitimation crises.
Ultimately, its fate too would be shaped by the resolution of these crises.
Nevertheless, while the political elite has regained much lost ground, social
partnership has not only continued but its institutional supports have been
strengthened. Indeed, in practice, social partnership is now embraced by most
of the political establishment. 
Some commentaries have viewed CVP involvement as either undesirable
and undemocratic (O’Cinnéide, 1998/9) or grievously undermining the
independence of  “civil society” (Meade, 2005). The view here is that the
participants in the pillar had few other options but to participate in the initial
period, made some noteworthy gains for a time but were increasingly
constrained to operate with great patience and perseverance in order to
maintain any influence in the process. Moreover, several associations and
organisations in the CVP have often been obliged to go through difficult
internal debate in order to maintain coherence, recognition and relevance to
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from the arrangements and the eagerness of others to get in suggests that the
outcomes are not clear-cut.
III A CONTEXT OF CRISIS
Industrial Expansion and Crisis 
Ireland was still a predominantly agricultural country in 1961, with 42 per
cent of male employment in agriculture. Opening the economy in 1958 to trade
and foreign investment changed this, but the process was slow and new jobs
were cancelled by secular decline in the numbers occupied in farming (Hannan
and Commins, 1992, Teagasc, 2004). Total employment only grew by on
average 0.3 per cent annually while non-agricultural employment grew by 1.3
per cent between 1960 and 1990 (NESC, 1993, pp. 3). 
Ireland’s belated economic expansion was only a qualified success as
imports seriously impacted on the formerly protected indigenous industry
while non-agricultural industry made few inroads abroad (O’Malley, 1992).
Initially policy only drew foreign investors in the form of branch plants in
mature industries (textiles, footwear, clothing, plastics and light engineering)
and later in pharmaceuticals and electronics, but investors were attracted by
low wages and taxes, and plants were confined to semi-skilled production
stages. Furthermore, against expert advice proposing fewer, more sustainable
growth centres designed to generate positive spillovers, government policy in
the 1970s favoured geographical dispersion of investment. Although this is
defended on the grounds that it helped rural communities at a time when the
CAP favoured larger farmers (Hannan and Commins, 1992), there is a case to
answer as to its sustainability and the impact on traditional industrial
centres. The foreign sectors too – albeit not as badly as indigenous industries
– were hit by the oil shocks of 1973/4 and 1979 and many proved
unsustainable. 
A key policy reversal was signalled in the 1982 Telesis Report (NESC,
1982) that called for a turn towards high-value-added investment typically in
large population centres with a critical mass of high-skill and educated labour,
but it took considerable time for the latter shift in policy to take effect. Total
employment in the foreign sector actually declined in the 1980s as the benefits
of this strategy were overshadowed by closures in older sectors (O’Malley
1992). 
Population grew rapidly (15.6 per cent between 1971 and 1981) in a
context of high marriage and fertility rates and a reversal of net emigration.
Investment in post-primary and tertiary education, minimal to start with,
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growing young and increasingly educated generation, but as yet insufficient
investment to employ it fully at home. Government policy of increasing public
sector employment in the late 1970s was a sign of desperation in the absence
of a critical mass of new investment and was short-lived. By the mid-1980s,
therefore, emigration was beckoning even to the most highly qualified
graduates and the net outflows of the late 1980s had become alarming.
While inflation began to decline in the late 1980s, unemployment
ratcheted upwards. Taxation was already perceived as a millstone around the
neck by wage earners, who had mounted major protests in 1979. Yet
government deficits and borrowing were still required and the national debt
was so large in the 1980s that interest payments to service it made cuts in
social spending inevitable.
Fiscal, Legitimation and Governmental Crises
The elaboration of a system of social partnership was a long time in
coming about and may be viewed as the last resort of the political elite, which
had failed to respond to the fiscal crisis that had been welling up since the
early 1970s. The concept of fiscal crisis has been in the international literature
since the aftermath of the first oil shocks (O’Connor, 1973) and usually also
entails a legitimation crisis (Habermas, 1976; Held, 1982). Such a crisis in
Britain gave political expression to the new paradigm of neo-liberal economics
and neo-conservative politics, with an electoral mandate in 1979. Ireland too
was faced with a serious fiscal crisis and a deepening crisis of political
legitimacy. By contrast with the UK in the 1980s, Ireland lumbered from
election to election with what seemed – from a right or left perspective – as
half-measures, aptly summarised by Lee (1989, Ch. 7) as “drift”. Others go
further, noting that political decision-makers made errors that accentuated
the fiscal crisis (Honohan and Walsh, 2002). Indeed, the period of centralised
wage bargaining in the 1970s has frequently been held up as part of the
problem of drift and one reason why there was a return to decentralised
bargaining in the 1980s.
The immediate context for the initiation of social partnership in 1987 was
a unique political crisis. A newly installed minority government of Fianna Fáil
(FF) was promised the support of Fine Gael (centre-right) the main opposition
party, provided that FF introduced new austerity measures designed to control
spiralling state debt and deficits and restore balance to the public finances
(the so-called Tallaght Strategy). Such centre-right consensus had been
previously lacking and had contributed to a growing sense of malaise in the
political elite during the 1980s that not only threatened economic
sustainability but also widened the “legitimation gap” that was opening
between the political elite and the wider society (Larragy, 2002). 
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risked much by it, but also for the incoming FF Government, which was
“damned if it did and damned if it didn’t” address the fiscal crisis there and
then. However, responsibility for the cutbacks would fall on the government
party and could cost dearly in a subsequent election. The prospect of further
electoral attrition for Fianna Fáil was not to be treated lightly. This led them
to grasp the lifeline of proposals made by the National Economic and Social
Council (NESC), (NESC, 1986) as a basis for a new type of social pact between
employers and unions. 
The traditionally conservative Fine Gael and new right Progressive
Democrat (PD) opposition were then quite sceptical about this strategy
(MacSharry, 2000). Moreover, the survival of social partnership was not
inevitable – Fianna Fáil were forced into a coalition with the Progressive
Democrats in 1989 after a snap election went wrong. Fortunately for Fianna
Fáil, the PDs lost a considerable number of seats and were limited in what
they could impose by way of terms. Had they been stronger, the story might
have been otherwise. 
The key difference, in relation to the new social partnership
arrangements, unlike the 1970s experience, was that centrally moderated
wage bargaining from 1987 would be co-ordinated with austerity measures.
The trade union leaderships were prepared to buy into this approach: 
free collective bargaining had failed to raise wages in real terms in the 
1980s, union membership was in decline (Roche and Larragy, 1984) and the
prospect of a UK-style defeat by the new right was (following the miner’s
strike) viewed without relish.
Thus, the turn to social partnership, which ended the “drift”, was not a
decisive ideological paradigm-shift into neo-liberal “slash and burn” economics
by the political establishment so much as an institutional or policy-making
paradigm-shift.  Cutbacks had already been in train since 1982, only disguised
by inflation. Honohan et al. (2002) see in the launch of social partnership a
determination by unions and employers to set aside social class antagonism,
for the time being, in favour of a joint effort to remove barriers to employment
growth. Initially, the new institutionalism was to facilitate a period of sharp
fiscal correction. Far from spearheading a confrontation with the unions,
however, the government sought the incorporation of state and civil society in
the form of the trade unions and employers in a new consensus. The inclusion
of the farmers too was indicative of the fact that the agenda was already wider
than the management of industrial relations. These novel elements of the
model that began to emerge can perhaps justify the characterisations of
“competitive” or “liberal” corporatism.
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Seedbeds of the Community Pillar
The 1980s saw both a mounting crisis of unemployment, urban and rural
development, rising levels of income deprivation and social marginalisation
affecting all age groups. Hence, the institutional model of governance was not
yet complete or “legitimate” in the view of many until it was eventually
extended in the mid-1990s to include the voices of marginalised sections of
society as articulated via the community and voluntary sector. In the
meantime the brunt of the effects of the economic and fiscal crisis were felt
among the growing numbers of unemployed, others on low income who
depended on social welfare and groups who depended on the state for services.
Below, some of the origins of three key strands of opinion in what was to
become the Community Pillar are examined.
First, during the 1980s, as employment growth was stagnant,
unemployment rose to crisis levels and the extent of social marginalisation
was arguably unprecedented. In the 1991 census, unemployment was 233,890
(16.8 per cent) – high by comparative standards in Europe, with a high
percentage of long-term unemployed. In urban areas there were substantial
problems of economic and increasingly social marginalisation and many “black
spots” with catastrophic levels of unemployment and poverty (NESC 1997,
51ff; 85ff). The issue of unemployment provided the basis for the emergence of
organisations for the unemployed during the 1980s and at national level of
the establishment of the Irish National Organisation of the Unemployed
(INOU) in 1987. The INOU was sociologically rooted in the unemployed and
its agenda was defined around the goal of full employment and, pending that,
the protection of the rights of the unemployed and income maintenance. One
of the main defensive issues to emerge from interviews and in the literature of
the INOU, was the prevention of “workfare” schemes and punitive measures
being proffered at the height of the crisis and into the early 1990s. 
Second, rural life was also characterised by unevenness and inequality.
While there was unemployment in rural towns and villages, there was
considerable out-migration both to larger urban locations and abroad in the
1980s. Age profiles of rural areas typically exhibited the highest proportions of
elderly people, but also moderate young dependency rates. As agricultural
employment declined there were serious difficulties in fostering alternative
types of rural development activity. Certain areas, typically in the west, north-
west, border and midlands, were particularly vulnerable due to declining
population in the employment age group. 
One of the few hopes in the late 1980s was Europe. The 1987 Single
European Act (SEA) and completion of the internal market would provide
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foreign investors while threats to industry were by now limited as there had
been such a shakeout in the Irish economy already. However, it was a still a
very peripheral country with very poor infrastructure and, of course, the Irish
state was debt encumbered. The SEA in 1988, set the stage for radical shake-
up of the Structural Funds aimed at reducing regional development
disparities in Europe. Their objectives of supporting infrastructure, regional
development, economically deprived regions and localities and tackling long-
term and youth unemployment suited Ireland’s needs. In 1989, the EC
provided for a doubling of resources for the Structural Funds, in what was
subsequently known as the first of the Delors packages. Ireland as a whole
was designated an Objective 1 region, which ensured that Ireland received
priority status. Over the two subsequent periods, Structural and (after
Maastricht) Cohesion funding – between 1989 and 1999 – would amount to an
EC contribution of €11 billion.
The reform of the Structural funds involved new processes of consultation
and a “partnership approach” between the Commission, the Member States,
and national, regional and local authorities. The structural funds provided a
critical source of investment in public infrastructure at a time when Irish
governments could not. It also promised improved administration, simplified
procedures, and better monitoring. The new decision-making and consultation
procedures created scope for consultation with the community and voluntary
sector. This was a very important issue in generating another current of
opinion in what later became the Community Pillar. The Community Workers
Co-op (CWC) was closely involved with urban, rural and communities of fate
through its wide network of paid or voluntary community workers. The CWC
developed considerable expertise and ideas in relation to the deployment of
Structural funds coming under various operational programmes. It was here,
perhaps, that the seeds of a connection between local and national level
partnership were planted. The agenda of the CWC was to build on the
principles of local community level participation with aspirations to a radical
reshaping of democracy at the national level.  
Third, income poverty had become a major focus of attention since the
early 1970s and the situation appeared to worsen in the 1980s. In those days
the debate was much simpler than it is now. Poverty was deep whether
conceived in relative or absolute terms. In conditions of relatively sluggish
GNP growth from 1981 up to the late 1980s, mean disposable incomes actually
declined in real terms (Layte, et al. 2000, p. 166). In these circumstances, the
persistence of relative poverty had none of the ambiguous implications it does
today: people were both relatively and absolutely poorer. Moreover, that
poverty was strongly related to unemployment, which had been consistently
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unemployment and income distribution. Finally, the report of the Commission
on Social Welfare (1986) pointed out that social welfare payments were simply
“inadequate” in alleviating poverty, let alone in addressing more ambitious
redistribution goals. The Conference of Religious in Ireland (CORI) Justice
Commission, in particular, took hold of this issue and made it a key driver in
the agenda of the emergent CVP. It built its intervention in social partnership
around the issue of income maintenance and tackling poverty, highlighting
income inadequacy at every point and lobbying for a basic income for all.
Interviews with CORI representatives revealed the importance of its
“analysis” rather than its “representativeness” in defining its role in social
partnership. 
By the late 1980s, therefore, several sections of “civil society” had
responded to different facets of the crisis – chiefly unemployment (INOU),
marginalisation of local communities (CWC) and income poverty (CORI).
Before long these driving forces and other organisations would seek to widen
social partnership and bring these issues to its centre. 
To Enter Partnership?
There was a lengthy period before a community sector pillar was
eventually constituted in social partnership. Before the elements of what later
became the community pillar were to opt for entry, they first had to be
convinced that it was worth the trouble. They had just developed effective
voices but would these voices be silenced on participation in the new
institutions? One apparent fact that attracted their attention was that the
new tripartite system (plus farmers) was concerned with far more than
centralised wage bargaining. It was also having an impact on taxation policy
and emitting signals to government on social spending and income
maintenance levels such as how to respond to the 1986 Commission on Social
Welfare Report. The shaping of each agreement was closely supervised by the
Department of the Taoiseach and underpinned by a prior process of
deliberation at the NESC in which social partners actively participated in
wider policy discussions. This was a matter that the CORI and INOU were
greatly concerned about.
It was apparent too that these discussions were not simply tokenism. It
was the Programme for Economic and Social Progress (PESP, 1990) that first
announced a proposal to instigate local area partnership companies, which
would require involvement of local community organisations all over the
State. Yet few of the actors in the national partnership process had much to
say on the subject. Prefigured in a NESC report (1990), it appeared to have
been put on the agenda by the Taoiseach’s department in its capacity as go-
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Structural funds. This issue was of considerable importance to the CWC.
Unemployment, while viewed by the social partners and government as a
major problem, was not yet being directly addressed through social
partnership talks by 1990. Independent calls for a national forum of state and
civil society were mounting and would ultimately yield the National Economic
and Social Forum (NESF). The latter, when it came about in 1993/4, provided
a training ground in social partnership for representatives of the unemployed,
marginalised, poor and other discontented constituencies. Moreover, it yielded
some innovative policy proposals and provided encouragement that much and
more could be achieved through fuller participation in deliberative institutions
such as the NESC and Social Partnership – where the “real action” appeared
to be.
A further issue was the widespread resistance to the admission of
potentially disruptive and demanding “lefty” elements who were sceptical in
any event. Such resistance came not only from within the state but also from
among existing partners, as is acknowledged by those interviewed on both the
CVP and statutory side. Even sections of the trade union pillar had resisted
the creation of a new pillar – perhaps a backhanded acknowledgement of the
value of getting a foot in the door. The INOU was always convinced that it had
a moral right to represent the huge section of the working class that was not
“at the table” along with their employed brothers and sisters. It was only a
matter of time before it was persuaded as to its tactical merit. 
It has been noted that there was a crisis of legitimacy in the political elite,
and the political situation remained fluid in the 1990s. There were clear signs
that government coalitions – as became the normal pattern from 1989 – were
open to influence from the substantial part of the electorate that felt
economically and socially “disenfranchised” provided they could find a vehicle
to channel it. These factors would seem to have played some part in
persuading the new voices of the socially excluded to seek participation and in
breaking down the resistance of existing partners. 
Pillar Comes Together
The Community Pillar, as constituted in the 1996 talks, comprised 8
bodies, one of which the (Community Platform) was an umbrella acting for
several further groups (Figure 1). These organisations had varied philosophies
and practical agendas, although there was common ground in the context of
the depth and extent of disadvantage prevalent at the time. While
highlighting shared concerns, they retained their own distinctive analysis and
critique of current policies, and their separate identities, even when in social
partnership. 
The “Community Pillar” formally came into existence between the
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Partnership 2000 agreement that ensued from it later that year. Government
proposed the separate Community Pillar as a mechanism for regulated access
to social partnership for those associations wishing to be part of the process.
An alternative mechanism, favoured by the CWC, was that the Community
Platform, which they had initiated, would constitute the new “social partner”
and, as a bottom-up entity, offer more independence at the table. In the event,
both the Pillar and the Platform operated but the Platform was, as far as the
State was concerned, just another member of the Pillar. In any event, the
Platform had fifteen member organisations and constituted one of eight
associations recognised by Government as making up the Pillar. But some of
the other seven organisations with independent membership of the Pillar were
also members of the Platform (Figure 1). In a sense these organisations could
show solidarity with the Platform while maintaining the right to vote
separately in the event of a split over the terms of a Partnership deal or policy
matter. However, the clumsiness of how the Pillar was constituted also
suppressed fissures that would later surface.
386 THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REVIEW
Community Pillar members
1. Conference of Religious in Ireland*
2. Irish National Organisation of the
Unemployed*  
3. National Women’s Council of Ireland*
4. Society of St Vincent de Paul*
5. Community Platform (a group of
organisations – see column 2)
6. National Youth Council
7. Irish Congress of Trade Unions
Centres for the Unemployed
8. Protestant Aid (PA)
Community Platform members
1. Conference of Religious in Ireland
2. Irish National Organisation of the
Unemployed 
3. National Women’s Council of Ireland
4. Society of St Vincent de Paul
5. Community Action Network
6. Community Workers Co-operative 
7. European Anti-Poverty Network
[Ireland] 
8. Focus on Children
9. Forum of People with Disabilities
10. Gay and Lesbian Equality Network
11. Irish Commission for Prisoners
Overseas
12. Irish Rural Link
13. Irish Traveller Movement
14. One Parent Exchange Network 
15. Pavee Point
Figure 1: Structure of the Community Pillar and Platform in the Negotiations
for Partnership 2000 in 1996
* Organisations both in the Platform and recognised in the Pillar in own right.
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CWC and CORI. Other organisations became more central after a time, in
particular the National Women’s Council (NWCI) and St Vincent de Paul
Society (SVP). As noted above, the INOU, CWC and CORI were key elements
that emerged in the 1980s and later became the dynamos of the nascent CVP.
Each of these organisations was defined by critical responses to aspects of the
social malaise of the 1980s. However, the particular focus in each case was
distinct and different. For the CWC, involvement in social partnership at
national level grew out of its critical focus on the allocation and use of EU
Structural Funds through operational programmes promoting local
development in deprived and marginalised communities. The CWC
articulated a distinct view on matters of local empowerment through co-
operation and participative democracy. They also aspired to apply this
philosophy in the Pillar and in Social Partnership. The question of how far the
CWC could go with this amid the realpolitik of contending state and market
actors was not so sharply posed in the early 1990s as it would later become. 
The CORI Justice Commission had quite a different set of pre-occupations.
The Justice Commission was initiated in the early 1980s at a time when many
were critical of the Church’s obsession with private morality and an absence
of any economic critique of capitalist morality. Its focus was on economic and
social justice in several areas, particularly income deprivation. In the
immediate term CORI sought to have the Commission on Social Welfare
(1986) recommendations on minimum levels of payment implemented. In the
long term, CORI sought to replace the current system of tax and welfare with
a Basic Income system that was both work neutral and family-formation
neutral. The persistent focus of the CORI on income mechanisms gave it an
enduring basis for a critique of income maintenance policy measures and
frequent opportunities to intervene in the context of high profile events such
as the Budget and social partnership talks. When unemployment eventually
fell in the latter half of the 1990s, CORI was undaunted. Indeed it gained a
higher profile in that it could focus attention of the widening relative income
disparity between large welfare dependent sections of the population and the
newly prospering sections of those in employment.
Matters were otherwise for the third key organisation in the nascent
Community Pillar – the INOU, which provides the focus for discussion below.
In some respects, the INOU’s story is the kind that could be told about the
other Pillar participants and Pillar as a whole. In other respects it records only
the particular experience of one component in the Pillar. It is hoped that even
on the basis of a short account it will be possible to question some
generalisations about the Community Pillar, either to the effect that it
jeopardises democracy or that it simply incorporates the dissent that might
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eventually yield a different account that complies more with a view of this
interface of social actors and the state that has the merit of nuance. 
V IRISH NATIONAL ORGANISATION OF THE UNEMPLOYED
The INOU was founded in 1987 when a number of local groups and some
national organisations came together to form a national organisation. The
founding conference followed an almost unbroken series of monthly increases
in numbers on the live register between January 1981 and December 1986
(from 86,000 to 245,100). Some time later it appointed Mike Allen – made
redundant by a company in Galway in 1983 – as its General Secretary. Allen,
in his own account, stresses that it was unemployed people who established
the INOU (Allen 1998, pp. 3-4). The following discussion draws on recorded
and transcribed interviews carried out with five leading INOU figures
spanning the history of the organisation from the 1980s to the present.
From the outset, the INOU concentrated on mobilising the unemployed: 
In the beginning it was about mobilising unemployed people to politically
assert their rights and demands, so it was about trying to organise strong
local groups, gear them up to be campaigning, lobbying organisations, a lot
of street campaigns, demos, stunts, you know, on the ground stuff.
Initial hopes for success along this route gave way as protests failed to
happen on any significant scale. In late 1992, following a major organisational
effort, against a background of 300,000 unemployed, they could only mobilise
3,000 for a march demanding the right to work. One conclusion drawn was
that mobilising the unemployed failed because there was no positive element
in the unemployed identity: 
I suppose models that we were looking at in terms of mobilising civic society
(were) the black movement in the States, the women’s movement, the
disability movement. I think what we were learning was that unemployed
people didn’t necessarily self identify with unemployed movements so we
were not going to get much (with a) mass participation (…) strategy and we
had to rethink that a bit.
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made policy inputs to government and, although supported by some trade
unions, they were critical of the latter for not achieving any gains for the
unemployed in social partnership. They were probably unique in maintaining
the policy goal of full employment at the time, not only in comparison with
policy-makers and the trade unions, but also with other organisations in the
community/voluntary sector. They viewed campaigns for a basic income as
indicative of an “end of work” thesis, which they rejected as a distraction from
full employment. Here there was a clear difference with the CORI focus. The
INOU were particularly critical of the first agreement, the 1987 Programme
for National Recovery (PNR):
…  the underlying assumption in that agreement (was): ‘we don’t
particularly need to talk about unemployment in any real sense but it will
come right as a result of what we are doing here (through) some sort of
undefined process.
The next deal, the Programme for Economic and Social Progress (PESP)
agreed in 1990, also posed the issue of participation. But the INOU decided
not to seek to participate in talks then either, although it was debated. As one
informant noted:
… we weren’t strong enough: if we were there, we weren’t sure what we
would be pushing for and if we didn’t get it, we didn’t know what we would
do… you wouldn’t have been strong enough to be in there, in that ring.
Instead, they sought to engage with the trade unions, which promised to
articulate the interests of the unemployed and to listen to the INOU in the
PESP talks. Later, however, when the INOU became participants (in 1996),
they observed the limits of the earlier strategy. While the trade unions actively
engaged in the wage and related negotiations, the INOU negotiator noted:
… once it moved off wages, there was nobody in government buildings
except for (named ICTU official) and one or two other people. 
While this could be seen as class betrayal, said one respondent, the INOU
reading was more mundane: 
… It would be rare that somebody would deliberately ‘do you in’, but simply
by your absence your interest isn’t put forward, and you see that when you
are at the table yourself! 
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dialogue with certain government departments rather than with the formal
partnership framework:
We had established quite a good working relationship at a policy level with
Social Welfare around areas where we had common interests, where they
were trying to get people back to work, and we were saying: “this won’t work
and that will”. Obviously there were areas of conflict, where they were
trying to knock people off the dole. But, where there was common ground,
we developed quite good relationships, at a political level to some extent
and, more significantly, at senior civil servant level, so that their people
would talk to us about programmes they were developing.
The British experience under Thatcher and the threat of US style
“Workfare” coming to Ireland was fresh in the minds of the INOU. They saw
their role in part as defending against coercive approaches to active labour
market policies:
(These ideas were) constantly on the agenda from government’s point of
view and I suppose it is (…) a negative (…) way of stating the
achievements of the INOU. But, certainly, one of the achievements was
that there were programmes – I think absolutely, definitely – that would
have been introduced into Ireland, to no good for the people who had to go
through them, if it hadn’t been for the presence of the INOU.
In the event, a few years of capacity building took place before the INOU
actively sought to be involved at the partnership table. Two key policy
developments paved the way. First, the 1992 Joint Oireachtas Committee (i.e.,
representing both houses of parliament) on Unemployment, while short lived,
for the first time invited organisations of the unemployed and other related
bodies to make presentations, as equals, as the INOU saw it, alongside the
traditional social partners. It was established in response to calls for a forum
on unemployment from the INOU and others and was their first real hearing.
While the Joint Committee folded with the fall of the FF/PD coalition in 1992,
and had no substantive policy effect, it generated a short public debate on the
controversial and then hot topic of “Workfare”. More significant perhaps, from
a governance perspective, it furthered the campaign for an independent
Forum on unemployment – possibly emulating the Anglo-Irish Forum of the
mid-1980s – an idea that had been mooted much earlier, but was taken up
increasingly by the INOU. 
Second, following the collapse of the FF/PD coalition, the incoming
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ambitious and wider body than the Joint Oireachtas Committee. The non-
governmental sector were formally represented as members alongside elected
parliamentarians and government officials under an independent chairperson,
and at a remove from the Oireachtas. The NESF also included representatives
from the “traditional social partners”. Unlike its predecessor, the NESF has
survived, through a process of evolution, and has since become a significant
partnership institution, as noted above. The initial NESF had two broad
strands to address – unemployment and social policy. The INOU identified the
NESF as the central focus for its activity and made a very full intervention in
its first report on the ending of long-term unemployment (NESF, 1994). 
The experience of participation in the NESF strengthened both the public
standing of the INOU and its confidence that it could hold its own in the
central social partnership arenas. Also, the INOU had utilised the NESF to
work out a range of policies in dialogue with other policy actors, much of which
was now in a published NESF report, which it could use as a basis for
participation in partnership. It began to seek recognition of its status as
legitimate representative of the unemployed. The trade unions could not claim
to represent them adequately because unemployed people were usually not
union members. 
Of course, the INOU were not representative of the majority of the
unemployed in any formal sense, but they were the only dedicated
organisation of unemployed people and they were very conscious of their
accountability to the many local activist organisations that created and
supported them. They adopted a corporatist view of social partnership and
justified their place in representational terms on behalf of some 20 per cent of
the working population who were neither employed nor represented by the
trade unions. They saw themselves as different – in this sense – from other
community and voluntary sector organisations that began to seek social
partnership status around then and as having a more clear-cut case. 
The pragmatic engagement of the INOU in Ireland resonates to some
extent with developments in European employment policy, as expressed in the
Delors White Paper of 1993, the so-called Essen Process from 1994, the
provisions in the Amsterdam Treaty Title on employment, and later the
European Employment Strategy. Ireland was one of the member states more
receptive to these developments in the mid-1990s and promoted them under
its presidency prior to the Amsterdam Treaty. It is probably fair to say that the
INOU had a non-trivial influence in shaping the thinking of government over
that period.
By 1994 a new Rainbow coalition of Fine Gael, Labour and Democratic
Left had replaced the FF/Labour coalition. The incoming Taoiseach, John
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not see a special case for the INOU, but was disposed towards having a
mechanism to include the community and voluntary sector more widely in the
process. It is sometimes contended that the CVP were admitted to the talks in
1996 without any prior involvement in the preparatory process. This is not
quite correct: in 1995 representatives from each of the INOU and the National
Women’s Council were appointed as government nominees to the National
Economic and Social Council (NESC). The INOU utilised this opportunity
fully to influence Strategy into the 21st Century (NESC, 1996), which formed
the basis for the partnership talks that autumn. This was important to the
INOU:
We had a very fast learning curve ourselves in NESC I suppose but it did
make us realise very quickly how important NESC was and how that
Strategic document was the negotiations to some degree not just the
framework for it. … It was more strategically important than we thought it
had been to be on NESC.
The INOU pathway into Social Partnership was, of course, a means to
more concrete ends, and being a social partner was not an objective in its own
right. It was always seen as a double-edged sword. Indeed, the INOU almost
left social partnership at the first hurdle when a Partnership 2000 proposal to
implement the recommended minimum social welfare rates of the 1986
Commission on Social Welfare was pulled at the final stage of negotiations.
This was a critical test because one of the justifications for the INOU being in
the talks was precisely the failure of the unions to deliver this demand in the
previous deals and was pursued not only in the Partnership talks but also at
the preliminary stage of NESC deliberations. If the INOU now failed to
deliver, participation in Social Partnership would be effectively discredited. So
close to the wire did this issue go that Secretary General Allen was literally
walking in the doors of the national TV station to broadcast the INOU’s
rejection of the package when he got word from government conceding the
demand. This was a landmark in the INOU’s own terms, although strictly
speaking the deal would have gone ahead even if the INOU rejected it. It is not
clear exactly what other Pillar components would have done – they might have
stayed in.
It is not precisely clear what prompted the last minute concession but it is
more than possible that a good deal of tick-tack went on between the
ministries of the Taoiseach, Tanaiste, Finance and Social Welfare – after the
INOU position was known. Moreover, Fine Gael, Labour and Democratic-Left,
respectively, headed up these departments, which probably helped. It is
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let out in the talks. A consensus may have emerged that there was more to be
gained on the political front by conceding the point and taking credit for what
would probably be affordable in any event – a general election was due in
1997. This, rather than the notion of a strong bargaining hand on the part of
the INOU, seems more likely. Nevertheless, without the INOU to beat a loud
drum about it, the concession might not have been made. In the short term at
least, the entry tactic worked.
This episode should not overshadow the range of other matters that the
INOU had pursued actively in the NESF, the NESC, and the Partnership
talks, which were subsequently tied into Partnership 2000. These included
moderating the policy approach through active labour market policies that
were supportive and not punitive. They won commitments on the development
of a local employment service (LES), expanding Community Employment (CE)
and the continuation of the relatively generous Back to Work Allowance
(BTWA) schemes. It was on these more technical fronts that the INOU brought
a consistent influence to bear. This gave social partnership a moderating
influence on policies that the government were developing to move more
people from welfare to work. The INOU can with justification claim that they
persuaded civil servants of the merits of a more supportive active labour
market regime. This cannot be discounted: in the middle of 1996, investigative
research was carried out by the CSO on live register claimants, under cover of
the Labour Force Survey, and had been widely publicised in the media as proof
that many on the dole were making fraudulent claims. While there were many
voices calling for a hard line, this issue was handled in an even-handed way in
Partnership 2000. 
This outline does not deal with subsequent developments. But obviously,
when unemployment began to decline rapidly from 1996, the context for the
INOU changed too.  In time, its impact would lessen as a result of this. While
continuing to address a range of issues in relation to income maintenance,
active labour market policies, the treatment of the unemployed at social
welfare offices etc., the INOU has developed a more extensive service role. By
1997, the INOU representatives of the unemployed had made sustained
interventions over the best part of a decade, they developed considerable
expertise, and a credible on-the-ground presence. They were active in
developing a European network of similar organisations and learned about
policy alternatives to what was happening across the water. They had a very
articulate leadership that repudiated the culture of blame that neo-liberals
attach to the unemployed. They went into social partnership because that was
“where the action was” at the time, and because other methods yielded little
success. 
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Some commentaries – mostly by economists – have focused on the question
of whether social partnership had any impact on phenomenal growth rates
achieved in the 1990s (Baccaro and Simoni, 2004; O’Donnell and O’Reardon,
2000) and most of them have concluded that it has not. This paper is less
concerned with this type of economistic question than with identifying some of
the effects of participation by the CVP. For instance, Irish society, despite the
increase in total and average income and the ending of large-scale
unemployment and the effective achievement of full employment, is clearly at
least as unequal today in terms of relative income as it was in the early 1990s.
Are these outcomes that the INOU and other organisations involved in the
community pillar process could have done something more to avoid had they,
for instance, adopted a different strategy?  It would be tempting to say they
were incorporated into a neo-liberal project, but we do have to be wary of easy
generalisations and of anachronistic statements about missing the mark on
the equality agenda. Moreover, the impact of the INOU, and the CVP as a
whole needs to be seen in conjunction with that of the trade unions in social
partnership. A neo-liberal policy would involve labour market de-regulation,
the subordination of organised labour, depression of wages and possibly a
“shaking out” of manufacturing and related areas of employment where
unions were strong and productivity lagging. But one does not need to be an
apologist of social partnership to notice that that path was not pursued as the
foundation of the boom years of the 1990s.
Others have asked whether social partnership and the CVP, in particular,
compromised representative democracy by placing influence in a few hands
without clear lines of accountability (O’Cinnéide, 1998). In examining the
record of the INOU in retrospect, it is difficult to see how it might have
harmed representative democracy. It would be hard to justify a conclusion that
the CVP participation in social partnership was any threat to representative
democracy on the basis of the evidence of the INOU. On the other hand it
would be unfair to imply that the CVP was simply incorporated by the state,
particularly in the context of the very difficult issues and decisions it took and
the tactical successes it had. A fairer characterisation, is seems, is that the
CVP had a legitimate role in the context of social partnership. On a range of
issues affecting the unemployed and welfare-dependent population the CVP
took up a challenge in a way that was permissible and even laudable in a
democracy and helped offset the imbalance of power that otherwise would
exist in the institutions that were set up. They contributed to more moderate
policy outcomes than might have emerged without the institutions of social
partnership and without their participation in these institutions. Irish
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The INOU and by extension the CVP can take credit for moderating the
policies adopted by Irish governments in the 1990s on unemployment and for
defending the position of unemployed people on social welfare. It cannot be
credited with the achievement of full employment – though that was
eventually more or less achieved – but it can be credited for believing it was
possible when nobody else did, and for adopting the role of protecting the
interests of unemployed people in the context and achieving it.
The moderating influence exercised by the CVP should not be viewed in
isolation. It needs to be emphasised that its influence operated within the
institutional context of social partnership that, in turn, was resorted to by
government in order to address a serious fiscal crisis and crisis of legitimacy
among the political elite that flared up over a definite period. The CVP
influence has lessened in recent years and it may not easily regain the degree
of influence that it had while unemployment and fiscal crises were major
issues and it has had to adjust to a less prominent role. Indeed, in many
respects the problem of legitimacy, which faced the political elite, has passed
into history, while the community pillar now face a dilemma as they are no
longer able to confer legitimacy to the extent that they once were and may risk
redundancy. 
The prospects for the community pillar’s significance are not yet clear.
There have been significant departures from it and new entrants to it.
Moreover, much depends on the thinking of government, as it is no longer as
constrained to liaise with the CVP as it was. From this direction, claims have
been made for the significance of the Pillar in a “problem-solving” model of
social partnership, the implication being that it will be business as usual. This
view may minimise the actual significance of the Pillar in the past in
conferring legitimacy at a time when the political elite badly needed it. At a
moment when unemployment was a hot political issue and governments were
depending on garnering marginal voters, it paid to listen to the organisations
representing the unemployed and community sector associations. On the other
hand, it is seems obvious that there is a hierarchy of social partners in the
Irish model and the CVP is somewhat subordinate in bargaining power terms
in a model that might be characterised as “competitive corporatism” (Roche
and Cradden, 2003, p. 86). 
To say that the community pillar lacks strategic bargaining power is not
to deny any influence to it but to acknowledge that such influence has waxed
and waned. And the Pillar’s possibilities for achieving visible effects may
depend on the political significance of bringing the standpoint of voiceless and
vulnerable sections of society into the frame. The main “bargaining chip” the
CVP has in social partnership is whether it rejects or signs off on a deal. But
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a rejection might cost a government in popularity. That chip had an impact in
the context of negotiating Partnership 2000, when the threat to reject the pact
resulted in a last minute concession by Government. But the threatened
rejection of Sustaining Progress in 2002 by a section of the Pillar resulted only
in that section’s expulsion from the partnership process. Times have evidently
changed. 
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